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FROM HARMONIZATION TO INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN
SECURITIES MARKETS
EDDY WYMEERSCH *
1. Fragmentation versus integration
At present the state of integration of the securities markets within the European
Economic Community (EEC) can be characterized as follows: traditionally strong
centrifugal forces that formerly prevented integration still exist; yet these disinte-
grating forces are opposed by several centripetal forces, which although not a com-
plete counterbalance, nonetheless encourage the integration of the securities mar-
kets.
1.1. The forces of disintegration: fragmented national securities markets
Each of the Member States has a functioning securities market. These securities
markets differ greatly from one another in that each has its own distinct organiza-
tional structure. Moreover, some of the national markets are further divided into
submarkets, one or two of which play a leading role. Furthermore, since some
Member States impose no requirement that securities transactions be executed on
the official stock exchange, these same Member States have active "off-the-floor;'
markets in listed securities; in at least three of the Nine, trading on these unofficial
markets far surpasses trading on the national exchange floor itself, both in volume
and importance [1]. Lastly, loosely organized, semi-active parallel securities mar-
kets exist riot only in securities of local significance, but also in important foreign
securities which, due to insufficient volume, for example, are not admitted to the
official stock exchange. In addition to these centrifugal forces, when one considers
that each Member State also has its own individual rules on admission, trading, con-
trol, etc. of securities, it becomes apparent just how powerful the forces of division
are in the EEC.
* Professor of Law, University of Antwerp, Belgium.
0 378-7214/81/0000-0000/$02.50 © North-Holland
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
E. Wymeersch l Integration in the European securities markets
1.2. The forces of integration: contributing factors and efforts
Several factors, although not necessarily a counterbalance to the centrifugal
forces present, nevertheless encourage integration of securities markets in the EEC.
1.2.1. The Eurobond market
The most important factor contributing to integration is the Eurobond market.
Although it stretches all over the world, it can nonetheless be classified as a Euro-
pean securities market since its main centers are still located in Europe. The Euro-
bond market is so highly integrated that it is often described as a "supranational"
market, lacking a seat or domicile and therefore any submarkets. In fact, the Euro-
bond market is closely interwoven with the domestic securities markets of the EEC
members since the market is an alternative capital source where states, public agen-
cies and institutions compete with international organizations and private enter-
prises for long-term funds. The success of the Eurobond market is due td some
extent to the fact that national authorities have exhausted their domestic capital
markets so that these cannot offer any real competitive alternative to the Eurobond
market. This is particularly true as regards the more important securities issuers
whose issues can be placed on the Eurobond market with greater speed and effi-
ciency than on national securities exchanges. Unfortunately, since only debt securi-
ties are issued on the Eurobond market, companies are compelled to raise equity
capital on their own and other Member States' already over-subscribed domestic
capital markets (table 1).
1.2.2. Links between the national securities markets
The fact that there are nine distinct national securities markets in the EEC, each
regulating its own interests, does not mean that contacts do not exist between the
stock exchanges. First, arbitrage has been linking securities transactions among the
Table 1
The new issue market in Eurobonds [23
1975 % 1976 % 1977 % 1978 % 1979 %
1. Governments
and public
institutions 3,031 46 4,857 40 5,658 39 5,060 44 3,836 31
2. International
organizations 548 8 1,374 11 1,550 11 1,324 12 1,182 10
3. Private
enterprises 3,009 46 6,037 49 7,432 50 5,077 44 7,215 59
Total 6,588 12,268 14,640 11,461 12,233
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national markets for many years and as more and more securities are listed on more
than one stock exchange, its importance will probably increase. Second, participa-
tion by large banking or brokerage firms in several stock exchanges serves to link
"independent" markets. A good example on the national level is Germany, where
the larger banks have direct access to each of the German stock exchanges; on the
European level, a similar example is Luxembourg, where the majority of the mem-
bers of the Luxembourg stock exchange are foreign-controlled banks.
This second integration factor - links between the national securities markets
through broker participation - has been thwarted in its development on the Euro-
pean level because the Treaty of Rome principle of "freedom of establishment" is
not yet considered applicable to securities brokers. Some securities traders have the
legal status of "public officials" in their countries, and as individuals exercising
state authority, the Treaty of Rome exempts them from the freedom of establish-
ment rule (Art. 55 of the EEC Treaty).
1.2.3. Internal integration on the national exchanges
Integration of the different domestic markets has been much more successful on
the national level. Three of the Member States (Denmark, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) have only one stock exchange, while the French stock exchange
authorities do not permit multiple listings. The regulatory frameworks upon which
the national markets are structured represent varying degrees of integration: the
United Kingdom and Ireland merged their securities.brokers' associations, although
they maintain distinct trading floors which are not linked except by arbitrage (tele-
phone). Virtually identical regulations apply to each of their regional stock
exchange floors [3]. A movement towards uniformity can also be perceived in the
regulatory scheme of the German securities markets, where the eight state stock
exchanges were created by federal law. Although these independent bodies were
organized along state lines, each has adopted uniform stock exchange regulations.
France is likewise traditionally inclined towards centralization, which has expressed
itself in the fact that all stock exchanges are governed by the same decree. Italy has
also followed the path of uniformity: in 1974 the Italian securities markets were
reorganized so that regulations were made identical for each of the ten Italian stock
exchanges. Finally, integration of the national markets is brought about in most of
the Member States by the admission of the same securities to several of the do-
mestic stock exchanges and by the participation of the same brokerage firms in
several of these exchanges.
1.2.4. Supranational efforts towards integration: the OECD, the FIBV and the EEC
Attempts to better integrate the European securities markets have mainly con-
sisted of legal or regulatory measures. Several international bodies and associations
have drafted recommendations, resolutions and directives in order to encourage
integration or "interpenetration" of the markets, e.g. the recommendations of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and those of
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the F~dration Intemationale Des Bourses De Valeurs (FIBV) [4]. Both the OECD
and the FIBV lack rule-making authority; their recommendations or resolutions are
not legally binding upon their members, whether states or stock exchanges. On the
other hand, the European Economic Community has adopted several measures in
this field, some of which have a legally binding effect since Member States are
obliged to'implement internal legislation in conformity with EEC decisions.
(a) The OECD. The recommendations [5] of the OECD deal with the inforina-
tion to be disclosed upon the public issuance of securities. The first recommenda-
tion was published in 1974, and supplemented in 1976; this second recommenda-
tion contains very precise rules dealing with the content of issue prospectuses. The
OECD recommendations do not expressly state that their purpose is to contribute
to the integration of the securities markets. Instead, they state that their raison
d'etre is to contribute to the "progressive development of the financial markets,
nationally as well as internationally" [6].
(b) The FIBV The International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) [7] has
dealt with the problem of the fragmentation and integration of the securities mar-
kets on several occasions. Obviously under the influence of the United States dele-
gation to the FIBV, which was then struggling with its own National Market Sys-
tem, the Federation adopted a resolution in October 1975 recommending the con-
centration of all securities transactions on FIBV member stock exchanges. This
recommendation was reissued in 1977. Furthermore, in both 1975 and 1977 the
Federation adopted a proposal on multiple listing, referred to as "multinational
listings" in the resolutions themselves. Minimum requirements for admission and
disclosure were proposed in order to facilitate multiple listings. The 1977 Resolu-
tion used very broad language, stating that "it is in the interest of all people con-
cerned to encourage the official listing of securities ... An important step forward
would be set by adopting uniform minimum admission conditions .. . ". Although
the idea of market integration is wholly absent from the explicitly stated motives
of these recommendations, they nonetheless encourage it.
(c) The EEC. The harmonization, liberalization and integration of the securities
markets in the European Community were recognized as necessary by EEC author-
ities very early in the development of the Common Market. The Treaty of Rome
seeks to abolish obstacles to the free flow of capital within the EEC. Three Direc-
tives, each based on Article 67 of the Treaty, have made important contributions
towards this goal, but no significant progress has been made in abolishing the
remaining restrictions since 1962 [8]. At present, the following summarizes the
situation as far as stock exchange, transactions are concerned: all dealings on the
stock exchanges have been liberalized in general, but restrictions remain in force
with respect to the issuance of f6reign securities and the acquisition by residents of
foreign securities denominated in their national currency. Off-the-floor markets
have not yet been liberalized by the Community. Actual harmonization measures
have been few, but the recent Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange
Listing Directive [hereinafter Admission Directive] is of substantial importance [9].
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Another very important directive, the "Sixth Company Law" or "Stock Exchange
Prospectus" Directive [hereinafter Prospectus Directive], is expected at any time
[101. Other proposed directives concern continuous (interim) financial disclosure
by issuers of securities listed on the Member State stock exchanges [111 and invest-
ment funds [12]. In addition, certain company law directives, four [13] of which
have been adopted by the European Community out of eight in preparation [14],
have had beneficial, albeit indirect, impact on the integration of the market in com-
pany securities [151.
1.3. Integration factors in the. harmonization directives
The relationship between these harmonization directives and the idea of integra-
tion of the securities markets needs further examination. Taken as a whole, the pur-
pose of the harmonization directives is to implement a regulatory system in the
Member States of the European Community which will provide equivalent safe-
guards to investors. These directives are based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of
Rome, an article that is part of the Treaty's chapter on the freedom of establish-
ment and services; they are not based on the articles dealing with the liberalization
of capital flows. According to Article 54(3)(g), the Council of Ministers and the
Commission of the European Communities shall take appropriate steps to coordi-
nate "to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the inter-
ests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms
... with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community".
The clearly delineated powers of the European authorities should be under-
scored. They do not permit the authorities to order the integration of the securities
markets; rather, they allow them only to introduce equivalent safeguards for the
protection of participants (shareholders) or third parties (creditors, bondholders,
etc.) [16]. This limitation to matters dealing with the coordination of investor pro-
tection suggests that a certain minimum equivalent must be insured: Member States
retain their freedom to impose additional safeguards or to impose additional non-
discriminatory provisions [171. This is clearly evident in the adopted Admission
Directive and the Prospectus Directive, neither of which goes beyond fixing mini-
mum conditions or requirements.
Harmonization of admission conditions and disclosure requirements will facili-
tate the admission of securities to more than one stock exchange. However, listing
on one Member State's stock market ivill not result in automatic admission to the
other stock exchanges in the Community, since Member States are still permitted
to impose "additional" or "more stringent" requirements upon securities issuers
applying for admission to their stock exchanges. This will effectively restrict access
even for securities which have already been listed on another EEC exchange. The
Community method is therefore much more modest than the United States
approach, which achieves much more thorough integration by making all securities
listed on one stock exchange eligible for trading on all other stock exchanges or
markets [18].
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Harmonization of admission requirements will therefore stimulate multiple list-
ings. Today, most of the European stock exchanges (except those in Italy) [19],
are eager to admit securities listed in other Member States and on several occasions
issuers of securities have applied for admission to several European stock markets
simultaneously. Community authorities officially encourage this development since
it helps to further the Community's goal of integration.
As mentioned earlier, under the Admission Directive, national securities author-
ities retain decision-making power over the admission of a security [20] to their
exchanges. However, the Directive does significantly curb any tendency to arbitrar-
ily refuse admission to a security since Member States may only impose additional
or more stringent requirements if these are first, explicit, and second, published
before the application for admission is introduced. Moreover, according to Article 5
of the Directive, these requirements must exclude any discriminatory treatment.
These rules with respect to additional admission conditions not only serve to effec-
tively curtail the discretionary powers of the admission authorities, but they also
grant the legal right to be admitted to issuers who comply with all admission con-
ditions published by the Member State. Both points require some further elabora-
tion [21].
Once the Member States implement the minimum admission requirements set
forth in the Annexes to the Directives, they may impose additional conditions,
"provided that these more stringent and additional conditions apply generally for
all issuers or for individual classes of issuers and that they are published before appli-
cation for admission of such securities is made" [22]. These two requirements tend
both to insure that any national admission conditions enacted in addition to the
Directive's uniform minimum conditions are objective, and to prevent any arbitrary
refusal.
The requirement for objective admission conditions not only applies to tradi-
tional admission criteria (minimum capital, minimum number of securities in circu-
lation, etc.), but also to policy requirements (monetary, foreign exchange) and to
any other motives that have previously been invoked to deny admission to a secur-
ity. This interpretation of the Directive is justifiable, even though it is directly op-
posed to the goals expressed in the Directive's preamble [23], for two reasons: first,
a literal reading of the Directive supports this view, and second, an examination of
the area in which the rule of Article 5 is inapplicable buttresses this interpretation
of the Directive. According to Article 10 of the Admission Directive, the admission
control authorities may. depart from the objective additional conditions rule of
Article 5 in the area of investor protection only. So-called "special conditions" -
not "additional" as they are called in Article 5 - may be imposed only when they
contribute to the protection of the investor.
In contrast to the provisions of Article 5, Article 10() does not require these
"special" conditions "to be published before application for admission ... is made"
[24]. The national stock exchange authorities need only inform the applicant issuer
that they are requiring these conditions. Since unique questions of investor protec-
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tion may arise during the control procedure, issues that could not possibly have
been itemized in the standard "schedule for admission" of a particular Member
State, Article 10 allows the relevant authorities to supplement their normal admis-
sion criteria with "special" conditions tailored to the particular individual case
[25]. Since prospectus requirements fall into the category of investor protection,
they could probably be treated as "special" conditions. In sum, discretionary
admission powers have been removed from the rule-making authority of the Mem-
ber States except in the area of investor protection. Any restrictions based on gen-
eral political or monetary policies which the states desire to retain in their securities
admission procedures will have to be explicitly stated in a published instrument so
that issuer applicants will have notice of the additional conditions before demand-
ing that their securities be listed on the specific stock exchange. Thus, for example,
if the Belgian Minister of Finance wants to refuse to admit bonds issued by a
Luxembourg financial holding company, on the grounds that the securities in ques-
tion contain an inherent risk of tax fraud, he will only be able to prohibit the list-
ing of the bonds on the Belgian Stock Exchange if, prior to the time the applica-
tion for admission was filed by the Luxembourg firm, the Belgian Minister of
Finance had explicitly stated that Belgium will not admit any securities to the
Stock Exchange that are issued by, for example, enterprises incorporated in Mem-
ber States lacking a withholding tax.
If a listing on the stock exchange may not be denied to an issuer who complies
with the objective standards for admission, it is a logical, indeed inescapable, con-
clusion that these issuers have a right to be admitted. This right of admission is of
central importance to the philosophy upon which the harmonization directives are
predicated: giving the complying issuer a right to access considerably restricts the
freedom of the national admission authorities to refuse admission. According to the
preamble to the Admission Directive this individual right will "make for greater
interpenetration of national securities markets", for as larger securities issuers
broaden their search for available equity capital to other Member States, multiple
listings will follow, and serve to bind the distinct national securities markets more
closely to one another.
The Admissions Directive contains another feature which is likely to be a factor
in encouraging the integration of the European securities markets. Although the
Directive does not deal primarily with information disclosure, it does require issuers
of stocks and bonds admitted to one of the European stock exchanges to publish,
at minimum, information equivalent to the information disclosed on any other
stock exchange to which the stocks and bonds in question have been admitted
[26]. This equivalence rule applies in the case of securities "listed on stock
exchanges situated or operating in one or more Member States and in one or more
non-Member States", a reference not only to securities listed in the Community,
but also to those listed on stock exchanges in Japan, Switzerland, and the United
States. The Directive does, however, provide that in the latter case the information
need only be published if it "may be of importance for the evaluation of the
shares" [27].
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The effect of this equivalence principle on the integration of the European secu-
rities markets may prove to be even broader since several Member States still have
disclosure procedures that differ greatly from internationally accepted standards.
Thus, in those Member States whose securities laws have yet to require financial
dis&losure (e.g. Belgium, where "on-going" or continuous disclosure is still gov-
erned by generally applicable company law), the requirement will be introduced
into the respective legal systems because the Directive requires issuers of securities
with a multiple listing to publish equivalent information. Disclosure procedures in
the Member States will therefore be forced to rise to the level of the disclosure
policy of the most exacting Member State. Even in the absence of national dis-
closure rules, the Directive's equivalence rule will have to be implemented by the
national authorities dealing with the listing or delisting of securities [28].
Whether individuals (e.g. investors) will, as a matter of right, be able to bring
direct legal action to enforce this section of the disclosure policy depends on
whether the European Court of Justice recognizes the direct applicability of the
Directive not only to individual-state relationships, but also to disputes between
individuals, e.g. investors and individual issuers [29]. The Admission Directive also
contains other elements that will contribute to the integration of the European
securities markets. A close reading of the Directive shows its rule-making philos-
ophy to be based on a two-tiered policy that will probably guide all further har-
monization measures in the area of securities regulation in the EEC: first, at the
Community level a broad yet distinctive policy program is formulated centrally;
second, implementation of the program is left to the Member States. Committees
of National Experts under the guidance of the Commission produce a general plan
for the harmonization of national regulations. The resulting council Directive is
legally binding on the Member States. Yet the implementation of this centrally
formulated program is left entirely to the national authorities: the result is agreed
upon, but there is absolute freedom concerning the forms and methods chosen
for implementation of the Directive.
A rather striking feature of the Directive is that both public regulatory bodies
and private, corporative or self-regulatory organizations are put on the same footing
as far as their acceptability as instruments for the implementation of the central
policy is concerned. But from the perspective of the Community's legal order it is
immaterial whether the obligations imposed by this, or any forthcoming, directive
are implemented in Italy by legislative act, in France by changing a Decree, or in
Great Britain by amending the Listing Agreement, which is no more than a private
act. The EEC is not concerned with form or methods, but with results, so this mix
of public and private authorities is acceptable, provided that the desired outcome is
achieved. Similar reasoning can be seen in all other areas covered by the Admission
Directive, with two exceptions: Article 15, which requires Member States to orga-
nize a review procedure of their own choice before the courts of general law, and
Article 19 [30], which deals with matters of professional secrecy. State regulation
seems inevitable in both of these situations [31].
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It is unclear whether the regulatory pattern described above will have to be fol-
lowed in future harmonization efforts and whether it will necessarily result in inte-
gration of the markets [32]. However, it is apparent that the model of integration
which would result from its adoption would be very different from the system
which exists in the United States, where the central government agency, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, has been directed by Congress to use its authority
to establish a national market system in which all separate market centers will be
required to participate. Europeans obviously do not desire this type of central con-
trol body, but even if they did, strong legal, especially constitutional, objections
would be raised if a central control authority were granted such extensive power
[33].
This preference for decentralized local or national control is reflected in several
other European measures relating to securities. For example, even though the con-
tent of the rules under the Admission Directive is fixed at the Community level, it
is the domestic authorities who supervise the actual application of the rules and also
perform all control and surveillance activities relating to them. In a sense, the need
for vigorous central policy-making is harmoniously joined with the need to respect
the characteristics of each Member State's legal system. This is so because it is
assumed that each is equally suitable to furthering the Community's goals. The
European authorities will monitor the acts of the Member States to be certain that
the Directive's guidelines are in fact implemented and respected: apart from the
possibility of individuals asserting the direct effect of the Directives before domes-
tic courts, it is the Community that bears full responsibility for ensuring that Mem-
ber States implement Community obligations [34].
This last issue may present novel difficulties. In several Member States the imple-
mentation of the Community Directives will occur through a legislative process in
which a statute will be changed. At least two Member States have a long-standing
tradition of so-called "self-regulation" and "corporative regulation" [35]. Since
the Admission Directive and future European Directives will not be concerned with
implementing techniques, a problem may emerge: purely private rules will indeed
implement the binding Directive provisions satisfactorily, but since these acts do
not, legally speaking, constitute state action, it is questionable whether individuals
will have a private right of action against private bodies that do not respect Com-
munity norms in the area of securities regulation. Recognition of horizontal direct
effect with regard to Directives would resolve the problem favorably even from the
viewpoint of those defending self-regulation [36].
2. From harmonization to integration
Efforts to harmonize the European securities markets are necessary and useful
in that they lay the foundation for future integration. However, these current
efforts, though encouraging integration, will never bring it about. European inves-
tors may indeed enjoy, if not identical then at least "equivalent", safeguards with
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respect to securities admitted to stock exchanges within the Common Market.
Additionally, the flow of capital will be freer and foreign stock exchange markets
will likewise be more accessible. But all this falls short of integration. It would in
fact be possible for the European market structure to remain divided into nine dis-
tinct submarkets, each having its own traditions, regulations, etc. and yet for these
same markets to be freely accessible and also compatible with one another. Links
between these submarkets would be limited to arbitrage for securities with a mul-
tiple listing.
The disadvantages of permitting the Community's securities markets to stop at
this degree of harmonization are clear. First, investors will fail to derive any benefit
from multiple listing, since arbitrage experts alone will reap the advantages of the
continuing price differences. Second, regardless of where the order is executed, the
investor will not receive the best terms to be had, nor will it be possible to execute
an order for a particular security on the market with the best terms since stock
exchange rules may require that orders be executed on the national stock exchange.
Third, the combination of these two factors will have the effect of undermining
investor confidence. Fourth, a large pool of long-term capital, so necessary if gov-
ernments and enterprises are to satisfy their financial needs, will not be created
because new securities issues will not automatically penetrate all the national secu-
rities markets; only so many as the issuer decides merits the effort of applying for
a listing. Finally, the same administrative and procedural barriers on the national
stock exchanges, which have hurt the securities exchanges in their competition with
the Eurobond market, will continue to make the stock markets less attractive to
investors.
Real integration of the securities markets in Europe cannot be achieved without
interaction between all demand and all supply. Geographic price differences for
a given security will then no longer exist. This integration of EC securities markets
could be achieved if a three-pronged approach were followed: first, present efforts
at harmonization were continued; second, measures for market and issuer related
disclosure were adopted; and third, a communication network were constructed so
as to insure better market transparency.
Beyond harmonization and liberalization, integration could best be promoted by
connecting the different national submarkets with a telecommunications network.
Such a system would enable market participants in Europe to receive information
about the prices paid for securities, as well as the terms or conditions asked or
offered for them ("quotes"). It would further enable intermediaries in the secu-
rities markets to execute orders directly with all other stock markets. A detailed
outline for such an Integrated European Securities Market is set out below [37].
3. Towards an Integrated European Securities Market
The idea of an Integrated European Securities Market, which could effectively
compete not only with the U.S. securities market but also - and perhaps more im-
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portant - with the Eurobond market, has become increasingly attractive in the last
several years. Pleas for the construction of a Euro-Exchange have come from within
the various Member States [381; high-ranking stock exchange officials have likewise
expressed interest; the Commission of the European Communities has endorsed the
idea [39]; and one Dutch author has gone so far as to present a fully developed
scheme for a European securities market [40]. The elaborate scheme for an Inte-
grated European Securities Market which follows is an attempt to further stimulate
the current thinking and reflections on the subject [41]. This proposal for an Inte-
grated European Securities Market does not purport to deal with all the issues, nor
does it take into account the sequence of decisions that would have to be followed
in organizing the n~w system.
A brief examination of some essential policy questions is necessary before the
proposed scheme can be fully understood. First, an integrated market is one in
which all buy orders for a security (wherever they originate) interact with all sell
orders for that same security. Theoretically, these competing forces result in a mar-
ket equilibrium, at which point the order is executed at the "best price". Practi-
cally speaking, efficient interplay of market forces results only from general order
interaction. This interaction can be achieved only through the use of telecommuni-
cation equipment and techniques which facilitate the transmission of information
and orders between all markets and between all participants in those markets. These
telecommunication techniques are different from automated execution systems
because in the former the final decision to execute a transaction always remains
with the market participant placing the order in the system. Second, organization
of an integrated market does not necessitate departure from present stock exchange
rules that require all orders for listed securities to be executed on national stock
exchanges; nor does it necessitate a change in rules that restrict security transac-
tions to "official securities traders", whether brokers or dealers. The current sur-
veillance system can also remain unchanged provided that it affords sufficient safe-
guards to participants in the integrated market. Third, it must be emphasized from
the outset that the organization of an integrated securities market is a gradual pro-
cess. Indeed, the move from the present fragmented market system to a unified
market must be a slow, step-by-step occurrence so that the healthy market equilib-
rium currently in existence will not be unduly disturbed.
3.1. The securities
Only the most important and most active securities presently listed on the
national stock exchanges would be eligible for participation in the Integrated Euro-
pean Market System. This might mean that only securities with a multiple listing
would be admitted to the System, or at minimum, that no securities would be
granted entry to the System unless they had been previously admitted to one of the
national stock exchanges. This transfer of a security from its national stock
exchange to the Integrated European Market System would occur automatically
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and would be governed by objective criteria such as the number of securities issued,
minimum capital, trading activity on the national exchanges, etc. The national
authorities charged with admitting securities to the stock exchange would continue
to be competent authorities with respect to the primary admission of securities to
the exchange. They would also continue to administer any applicable rules relating
to disclosure or dealing with business ethics and behavior [42].
Organization of the Integrated European Market System would not inevitably
result in the abandonment of the present policy of multiple security listings. Com-
puter technology is sufficiently advanced to permit the exclusion of any trans-
actions in securities that have not been officially admitted to the Stock Exchange
in the Member State from where the order originates. All orders for these securities
would have to be executed by a securities trader in another Member State where
the issues were listed. This practice is identical to the present system except that in
the Integrated System order transmission would be greatly facilitated. Thus, for
example, in Italy, where very few foreign securities are presently listed, and pro-
vided that Italian residents would not be prohibited from acquiring such securities
abroad, an Italian bank or broker would be able to purchase all Systems securities
by transmitting his order to a London broker or to a Luxembourg bank, even if
these securities were not admitted to the Italian stock exchanges.
It may actually be advantageous for Member State to retain the present multiple-
listing policy since it enables them to control their own admission policies more
easily. However, as admission conditions and prospectus requirements gradually
become more and more harmonized, the usefulness of maintaining a nationally
distinct admission policy will become less apparent. For issuers, this progressive har-
monization will undoubtedly make multiple listing less burdensome and undercut
existing objections to multiple listings.
3.2. The telecommunications system
Integration of nine national securities markets into a single unified market can
be achieved only by connecting these different national markets with a sophisti-
cated telecommunications network. Such a network (which would utilize already
existing telephone lines) would transmit information processed by one or more
computers located in one or more Member States. Terminals in the form of CRT
(cathode ray tube) screens would permit on-line access to the Integrated Trading
System.
The question of the language to be utilized in the telecommunication system is
not a particularly important problem, but it would need to be decided whether har-
monization could best be accomplished by adopting a specific language or whether
some type of "translating" computer could be used. A second related technical
problem is whether a single computer would be used, or whether - and what is
probably preferable - different national computers would be used. This system of
interconnected computers raises the possibility of nonparticipation of some Mem-
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ber States in the Integrated Market, or perhaps participation in one direction only,
i.e. permitting the System to be used in domestic securities trading, but forbidding
residents from using the System to purchase foreign securities.
What information would be transmitted through the System telecommunication
network? At a minimum, the System could function as a sophisticated multilateral
"arbitrage system". Instead of the current frustrating arbitrage system, in which the
participating brokers must telephone several correspondents before an order can be
placed, the new communication system would work like a private telex system and
allow market participants to transmit their orders more efficiently. This minimum
approach is unsatisfactory, however, because it does not provide market traders
with the vital information necessary for the giving of arbitrage orders. The defi-
ciency could be corrected in two stages: first, on-line access to sales price informa-
tion on member stock exchanges could be provided, and second, information as to
"bid" and "ask" prices ("quotes") on these same markets could be given.
Every European stock exchange has had a transaction reporting system from the
beginning: they are called the daily stock list, the "cote officielle" or the "prijs-
courant". Generally, these price lists contain daily summaries of prices reached on
the stock exchanges, but they are available only after the closing of the trading day
and deal with prices reached on the particular exchange only, to the exclusion of
transactions that occurred on other stock exchanges. Some Member States have
more technologically advanced reporting systems that furnish information concern-
ing completed exchange transactions and, in at least one case, even synthesize infor-
mation obtained from several participating exchanges.
A computerized transaction reporting system can best be compared to one of
these "daily stock lists" but with the important distinction that the information
would be available on a real-time basis, and would therefore permit not only
brokers but also investors to intervene in the market - in the process of price for-
mation - for example, by placing additional orders or instructing their brokers to
do so. This electronic newspaper would also combine price information from all the
European stock exchanges. The introduction of such a communication system
would not result in any harmful side effects. Present trading patterns and habits on
the stock exchange floors would not be disturbed too greatly. Brokers would only
have to alter their trading patterns to the extent of having to use special "slips"
when executing orders, and then having to turn in these "slips" to a central reposi-
tory which would read, analyze and process them electronically.
Information collected on each of the national stock exchanges would be made
available to all stock exchanges, brokers and investors willing to pay the service
charges. Several techniques could be used to redistribute this information: last sale
information could be retrieved by all subscribing parties by having all prices at
which the last sale(s) has been executed displayed on their CRT terminals; another
method would allow display screens simultaneously to show last sale reports that
relate to each of the national exchanges, thereby permitting arbitrage to flatten out
any price differences. Finally, trading activity could be followed by a sequential
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projection of all sale reports in all or a selected list of securities. Arbitrage would
become more transparent, more accessible, and therefore much easier, since all mar-
ket participants would be simultaneously informed, on a real-time basis, of all
market movement on each of the national exchanges. This would enhance integra-
tion of the securities markets since price differences which would keep the national
markets distinct would be unable to survive the pressure of this form of arbitrage.
In addition to this arbitrage-oriented transaction reporting system it would prove
highly useful to install a second communication line through which brokers, and
possibly other market participants, would be able to direct buy or sell orders from
their own market or office to any other European stock exchange. Essentially, this
would only entail improvement of present communication techniques, since tele-
phone calls and telex messages through the official telex system would simply be
replaced by a more streamlined, uniform, and exclusive telecommunication system.
This order transmission system would enable brokers or dealers having access to one
of the national stock exchanges to direct orders to their colleagues on other stock
markets. The orders would then be executed in the normal way, i.e. with the inter-
vention of a local broker. Orders could be transmitted from the floor of one
exchange to the floor of another exchange, or from the offices of the order-direct-
ing brokers to the receiving exchange floor. It would be up to each of the partici-
pants to choose his correspondents on the other stock exchanges, a practice that
would coincide with present methods of trading. Order execution would require,
in accordance with national regulations, the intervention of a broker who would
execute the order on the stock exchange according to existing practices on his
exchange. Thus, for example, the receiving broker would bring the order to the
floor and if it could not be executed at once he would treat it according to prevail-
ing rules with regard to unexecuted limit orders. Unexecuted market orders would
be reported back or might instead lapse automatically after a very short waiting
period. When rules relating to stock exchange trading become more fully harmo-
nized, a final step would be to enable order execution to occur without the inter-
vention of a broker on the receiving stock exchange [43].
Attention should also be focused on the so-called parallel markets in which listed
securities are occasionally traded at more favorable prices than on the stock
exchange itself. The best approach is probably not to compel the Member States to
enact legislation requiring all transactions in listed securities to be executed on the
stock exchange because it would be difficult to monitor implementation of such
a restrictive requirement. In addition, it may be a mistake to prohibit market-
making activity outside the stock exchanges: so long as the transparency of the
market is not threatened it may be unwise to force all trading in securities into the
single confining "mold" of commission brokerage.
The existence of competing alternative forms of dealing may greatly benefit mar-
ket health. Parallel market-making activity could be permitted, provided that all
transactions occurring in these off-the-floor markets were reported to the Inte-
grated European Market System and dealers were also required to transmit bid and
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ask prices to a central quotation system (discussed infra). Similarly, other differ-
ences in the methods and techniques of stock exchange trading in the Member
States could be reconciled by requiring all trading, regardless of form, to be
reported in this same transactions reporting system [44].
Informing market participants of prices realized on a national stock exchange,
although relevant to any decision whether to place an order for a security in the
future, will only partly achieve the goal of market transparency because reported
transaction prices relate only to historical information. Indeed, complete inter-
action between the national securities markets will only occur when all market
participants have ready access to information dealing with the offer of and demand
for securities. It will always be somewhat of a gamble to transmit an arbitrage order
unless one knows not only what the most recent transaction prices are, but also
what the present state of demand and supply is for the security or securities in
question. Price differences between national markets will never be eliminated until
market participants know the terms and conditions offered on all markets. There-
fore, a third communication system would have to be created, in which the "bid"
and "ask" prices on each of the national stock exchanges would be collected, trans-
mitted, processed, classified, and rebroadcast to all market participants. In posses-
sion of information from this central quotation system, participants could continu-
ously determine what price differences (if any) for a given security existed between
the national markets and, all other factors being equal, this knowledge would
enable these same differences to be erased. The result would be the effective inte-
gration of the markets, since all prices on the European stock exchanges would be
largely identical.
The organization of an integrated quotation network would not, from a tech-
nical point of view, pose insurmountable problems. At present, there are two
trading techniques for securities on stock exchanges in the Member States. First,
some stock exchanges require all transactions to be executed through a "market-
maker", e.g. a jobber on the London Stock Exchange. This means that no bid or
ask orders are recorded as such, but that the status of the market is reflected solely
by the jobber's quotes. A second, and different technique of securities trading is
followed by the majority of Member States: buy and sell orders are collected by the
stock exchange authorities who then use this information to set an equilibrium
price, i.e. the price at which the largest amount of orders for a given securitiy can
be filled. In several Member States no price equilibrium can be set unless all brokers
have been allowed to intervene in the price-fixing procedure, for example by sub-
sequently offering securities at a more favorable price. After the price is initially
set, brokers then trade in securities by matching their orders with those limit orders
displayed after the price equilibrium procedure has been followed.
These two types of securities trading will have to be harmonized. First, the job-
bing system will need to be included in the auction trading system currently fol-
lowed by the majority of the Member States. The best approach would be to con-
sider the London jobber's quote as simply the position of one of the participating
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stock exchanges. London jobbers would then be required to introduce the quote(s)
they are currently displaying on the trading floor on London into their system ter-
minals [45]. With respect to the auction procedure that is followed in most other
stock exchanges, the "current quotation" in the integrated quotation system would
consist of the aggregation of all bid and ask orders communicated on the floor of
each of the exchanges. Thus, for example, if there was an aggregate demand for
1,500 shares XYZ at a price of 15 each on the Paris Bourse, and an aggregate offer
of 700 of the same shares at the price of 16, the current quotation would be trans-
mitted as follows:
quantity B A quantity
Paris 1,500 15 16 700
This 15116 quote would be comparable to the quote coming from the London
jobbers:
London 500 15- 15;r 200
Similarly, all other stock exchanges would collect comparable aggregate data and
transfer them into the electronic systems. The most favorable current bid or ask
offer would be classified first. Furthermore, all participants would be informed
simultaneously as to the price differences among each of the national stock ex-
changes. Since arbitrage would be made much easier by the above-mentioned order
transmission system, price differences between the Member States would disappear
almost instantaneously. If a Londonjobber were to offer a bid price higher than the
price prevailing on another market, he would attract a large number of orders. If he
considered the number to be excessive and therefore undesirable, he would lower
his bid to the level comparable to the current bids prevailing on the other stock
exchanges. Arbitrage would be multilateral: price differences between Paris and
London would be bridged by orders coming not only from Paris, but from Amster-
dam, Brussels and Frankfurt as well. A further advantage of the proposed integrated
quotation system is that commission orders would be matched against commission
orders as well as against market-maker quotations. Trading on the market would no
longer be limited to just commission business or just market-making activity.
Rather, market health would be enhanced since both forms of dealing, in competi-
tion with each other, would constitute market trading.
Orders at the market may require separate treatment. On most of the European
stock exchanges these orders are executed during the first hour of trading on the
exchange; it is this activity which in fact gives rise to the "opening price". This
present technique is not incompatible with the new trading procedures proposed.
At the opening of each market day all orders placed on each of the national ex-
changes would be transmitted to the integrated quotation system and electronically
processed; the proposed equilibrium price would be communicated to all stock
exchanges. Brokers and jobbers would then be able to offer more securities or to
place new purchase orders, both of which would influence the opening price. After
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this early morning "auction" had occurred, the daily opening price would be fixed.
All future trading would occur against the unexecuted limit orders. New orders
could always be added and all would contribute to the establishment of that
exchange's current quotation. All market participants could at any given moment
request the CRT display of the composite quotation for a given security and then
use this information to choose the most favorable market for the execution of their
orders.
The proposed telecommunication system attempts to preserve the present pat-
terns of securities trading in the Member States as much as possible. When these can
be made compatible - and they can - there is no reason why any of the European
states involved should ibandon their systems. Furthermore, integration of different
patterns of securities trading offers a wider range of possibilities within the system
itself. Retaining present rules and structures would not necessarily sacrifice the
transparency, fairness, liquidity or depth of the securities market.
Automatic order execution, in which a transaction is entered into as soon as a
response to a displayed limit order is put into the system, should be dealt with
briefly at this point. If necessary, some type of automatic execution facility could
be added to the proposed telecommunications system. Such a facility, which might
be especially useful for smaller orders, could be connected to the overall system.
It would constitute merely one of the methods for executing an order for a security
and would result in nothing more than an additional quotation on the CRT screens.
A final remark should be made about the clearing and settlement of executed
transactions. Obviously, once the first step towards integration will have been
taken, and all transactions will have been reported in an electronic system, then
clearing and settlement of the transactions will have to be dealt with electronically
as well. Here again it might be preferable to connect the present national clearing
systems with each other rather than to construct one mammoth clearing system.
So long as the national clearing systems acted in concert, this approach would be
successful.
3.3. An appropriate regulation for transaictions in the Integrated European Market
System
Certain aspects of securities trading within the Integrated European Market Sys-
tem would have to be commonly regulated, or at least a thorough policy of har-
monization pursued. Otherwise the danger is that the complexity of these new
trading techniques would frighten their intended users who have a traditional dis-
like for electronic systems. The set of rules which follows could be enacted in each
Member State according to national rule-making procedures, provided that its con-
tents, if not identical, are at least highly comparable.
First, the regulation would describe the conditions under which the integrated
market would function. Procedures of order transmission and execution would
receive special attention, since the reliability of the system is in issue. Certain ques-
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tions would have to be dealt with. Under what conditions would the refusal of an
order, transmitted in response to a quotation communicated by one exchange to
another exchange, be permitted? [46] How would order precedence be determined
in the situation where several orders are simultaneously transmitted in response to
the same quotation? These and other technical questions would have to be resolved
after study. Another, and more general issue which would have to be resolved
before an integrated quotation system could be organized relates to the question of
whether the offers contained in the quotations are legally binding, or instead,
whether they are mere invitations to make an offer. Since it is essential that offers
in the system be reliable, the correct solution of this problem is extremely impor-
tant: it will determine whether the entire system is functioning correctly or not. In
the United States - contrary to the approach followed by Eurex - the offer has
been declared binding by government regulations. In Europe, quotations furnished
by the stock exchanges and by London jobbers are firm. Additional rules will need
to be made concerning the number of securities which may be offered in these
quotations. As far as the stock exchanges are concerned, this is merely the aggregate
of the quantities for which limit orders were transmitted to the stock exchange. An
appropriate rule to deal with traders such as the London jobber or other market-
makers will have to be made as well.
It would be preferable to limit System trading to cash transactions. If some
Member States felt it desirable to add some form of leverage, this could be orga-
nized at the broker-investor stage of securities trading, so that it would not affect
the market itself. Furthermore, at least one Member State is presently considering
the possibility of closing down its forward market (march6 a terme). Whether other
forms of negotiation (e.g. options) should be included in the Integrated Market will
be deferred for later analysis. Limit orders, however, would fit into the proposed
system very well, while orders at the market could easily be integrated into the
overall trading system.
It would not be necessary to denominate the entire securities market in a single
currency under the regulation, although this would be possible and has been pro-
posed as a way.in which to support the European Monetary System. At least in the
beginning, all transactions, quotations, etc. would have to be expressed in the
national currency in which the security itself is denominated. Thus, tfansactions
would be in the currency of one of the Member States, usually the currency of that
Member State where the principal office of the issuer is located. Securities which
could not comply with this rule would be traded in an agreed upon EEC currency,
or even in their own national currency. It would be up to the Member States and
their respective stock exchamge authorities to decide whether they prefer to receive
data flows expressed in the original transactions currencies, or in their own national
currency. If necessary, a "translation" computer could be utilized to convert the
various currencies present in the central data flow into a given national currency, as
communicated by the foreign exchange authorities or by the foreign exchange mar-
kets.
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The fundamental requirement that securities be traded under more or less com-
parable conditions in each of the Member States demands that identical, or at least
largely harmonized, rules govern the conduct of investors acting as principals for
stock exchange orders. Specifically, rules dealing with abusive practices such as
price manipulation or insider trading will have to be introduced. An integration
proposal ought not to fail to deal with these issues since otherwise some national
securities markets would be protected by rules against insider trading while other,
equally accessible markets would not, and therefore would be open to possible
abuse. Safeguards in this area should be agreed upon centrally, but implementation
and enforcement should be entrusted, as always, to the national authorities. The
investigation of alleged violations within the system should likewise be initiated by
a central surveillance authority, but further legal action, such as prosecution, should
be left to the appropriate national corporative or judicial bodies.
3.4. Access to the Integrated European Market System
Formulation of totally new rules to govern access to the Integrated European
Market System might disrupt integration of the securities markets. Therefore, the
discussion which follows starts with the assumption that, insofar as access to the
stock markets is concerned, as little as possible of the status quo should be changed.
Thus, access to the Integrated Market System would be governed by national laws
and regulations: only those firms or enterprises with access to their own national
stock exchanges would be connected to the System's telecommunications network.
Under this rule, for example, no banks would be granted access in Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Italy or the United Kingdom. In these countries the banks would
have to transmit their securities orders through a stock exchange broker who would
execute the transaction for them in the System.
Allowing access to be governed according to this scheme may give rise to some
objections. In at least three of the Member States (Luxembourg, The Netherlands
and the German Federal Republic) banks have direct access to the stock exchange.
They would likewise be permitted to participate directly in the Integrated Market.
Since some of these banks, especially those established in Luxembourg, are affili-
ated with banks established in Member States which deny banks direct access to the
stock exchanges (e.g. a French bank with its Luxembourg 100% affiliate), this
might seriously jeopardize present rules requiring all transactions in listed securities
to pass through the hands of a stock exchange broker [47]. This concern, that
transactions in securities would be diverted from one national market to another,
would not affect the proper functioning of the Integrated Market System provided
that all orders finally were executed in the System. But if Member States felt com-
pelled to protect their own intermediaries, they could enact rules requiring their
national financial institutions to direct stock exchange orders to national securities
brokers only. It should be mentioned that the problem of transaction diversion
already exists today and legislators have not felt it necessary to limit order trans-
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mission to the main market for the security involved, even if the security is listed
locally. Cost considerations and communication difficulties have kept most orders,
even for foreign securities, on the national markets. On the contrary, since it might
hamper the integration of the securities markets to allow each Member State to
protect its national market in this decisive manner, it might be preferable to forbid
any rules which require banks to direct stock exchange orders through national
brokers only.
The rule requiring all securities transactions to be channelled through a securities
broker or bank should be distinguished from the rule that requires all orders for
listed securities to be brought to the exchange markets. National regulatory systems
present various possibilities. In some Member States off-board markets, essentially
among banks, compete directly with the stock exchanges. It is accepted that this
state of affairs, in which the banks avoid the use of a broker (who would be neces-
sary if the trading were on the stock exchange floor itself), undermines the repre-
sentativeness of price formation on the market. In at least two of the Member
States [48] three-fourths to four-fifths of all trading in listed securities occurs off
the exchange floor. In the United Kingdom and Ireland a somewhat comparable
situation exists, essentially with respect to Eurobonds. Merchant bankers and com-
parable exempted dealers bypass the stock exchange and trade listed securities
between themselves. Whether it would be necessary to adopt a rule at the European
level requiring all transactions to be executed on the stock exchanges, and thus in
the Integrated Market System, would depend largely on the success of the inte-
grated market itself. If a considerable amount of activity in System securities were
to develop outside the System, then one of the following could be done: either all
transactions in securities could be required to occur within the System or, and what
is probably the preferable approach, the reporting of all trading in System securities
to the transaction reporting system could be required, along with a prohibition
against any trading outside the System at more favorable prices than those within
the System itself, unless all less favorable orders were first cleared.
A further development would be to extend access to the Integrated Market Sys-
tem to all intermediaries who, under their national systems, were allowed to ehgage
in securities trading. This access would be permitted even if these intermediaries
were bound under present national laws to transmit their orders to stock exchange
brokers. Direct competition between brokers, banks, and possibly "courtiers" and
"remisiers" would ensue; however, increased transparency combined with the com-
petition of agency orders and market-making activity would sufficiently protect
brokers who would find themselves in a relatively weaker position. In this case, all
security intermediaries would be subject to a comparable set of rules governing
their financial reliability. A surveillance mechanism to oversee their activities would
be introduced as well [49].
In several Member States restrictions are imposed on brokerage firms in order to
ensure their independence from outside influences that might exert undue pressure
on their activities as brokers and investment advisers to their clients. Guaranteeing
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the independence of the brokerage firms in question is achieved in the Member
States in different ways: some restrict shareholdings in brokerage firms, especially
by issuers; others limit their underwriting activities; still other Member States limit
brokerage activity to single trader firms or to partnerships of securities dealers:
Incorporated limited liability companies are forbidden. The participation of insti-
tutional investors as such is not expressly forbidden in any of the Member States.
The inherent conflict of interest underlying the issue of participation of institu-
tional investors in the securities markets has never been effectively solved in any
national system. Only Germany has a Code of Conduct which imposes upon the
banks involved a duty not to act against their clients. There have been no reported
cases of a bank being punished by the light sanctions provided for infringement of
this Code. Given the present stage of national rule-making, it is better not to deal
with this issue on the European level, at least not where regulations governing the
integrated market are concerned.
A more important question concerns the participation of nonresident brokers
or stock exchanges. As long as the Integrated Market System functioned only as a
linkage between stock exchanges, there would really be no problem. Japanese,
Swiss and United States banks or brokerage houses could gain admission by becom-
ing members of the Amsterdam or Luxembourg stock exchanges. Whether broker-
age firms would be allowed to participate without membership on any exchange
would depend largely on the financial guarantees offered by these firms. If identical
or similar guarantees were offered, and if these brokerage houses were willing to ob-
serve Codes of Conduct or other ethical tenets, as declared applicable to the inte-
grated securities market, then there would be no reasons not to admit them. Ade-
quate surveillance would have to be organized, e.g. by the control authorities of the
Member States where the offices of these firms are located.
3.5. Surveillance of market participants
The surveillance of market participants has a double function. On the one hand
it must ensure that any broker trading in the market is sufficiently solvent at all
times to meet all liabilities arising out of his market activity. Conversely, all market
participants need to adhere to a common Code of Conduct: surveillance to ensure
compliance with the Code will then be organized to guarantee honesty and equal
treatment of all participants.
Elaborate requirements as to broker solvency already exist in most Member
States. In some, brokers are bound to capital or to minimum assets requirements;
in other Member States, bank guarantees or insurance coverage must be secured;
while in still one other Member State (i.e. France), all brokers are jointly liable for
all liabilities arising out of business dealings on the national stock exchange. It is in
the interests of the European Economic Community that these safeguards be har-
monized; but national legislation could determine how these protective measures
would be implemented pursuant to a European-level policy decision.
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Since implementation of such safeguards may be very difficult, it would be best
if a special additional guarantee system were developed. This system would cover all
transactions executed in the Integrated Market System. Any safeguards decided
upon would be programmed into the Integrated Market computer system so that,
for example, any transactions exceeding set limits would be rejected, thereby auto-
matically limiting the risks taken by participants in the market. Legally, these
restrictions would take the form of guarantees by banks and insurance companies,
and would be stipulated on behalf of any other market participant. Payment or
execution on first demand would be provided for. The advantage of this simple for-
mula is that it would avoid the technically difficult question of solvency rules im-
posed by national securities control authorities. These national rules would remain
applicable and of interest to the banks or insurance companies guaranteeing the
brokers' liability, but they would not have a direct influence on the functioning of
the integrated market. It would be possible to use this approach as a complement to
harmonizing the present national systems ensuring broker solvency. Implementa-
tion, surveillance, and any sanctions provided for in the system would be entrusted
to the national control bodies. This approach to ensuring solvency would have the
advantage of extending the protection to which public investors are entitled to
cover all securities transactions, not just those which occurred in the integrated
market.
This same division of powers between the European and national authorities
would be advisable with respect to codes or rules of conduct for securities traders.
The European Code of Conduct relating to securities transactions, recommended in
1977 by the European Commission, would be a model for a Code to governthe con-
duct of participants in the Integrated European Market System. In order for the
integrated market to function correctly and equal treatment for market participants
to be guaranteed, it would be essential that this or some other generally acceptable
set of rules be declared applicable so that securities traders could be confident that
their colleagues were complying with the same standards. In any case, the integra-
tion of the trading market itself would be greatly disturbed if the rules were not
declared generally applicable and instead adopted by only some Member States.
Rules of Conduct, whether addressed to dealers in securities, company directors
or investors in general, would be made applicable in each Member State by their
appropriate authorities and in that form deemed most acceptable. The national con-
trol authorities would also be charged with surveillance and with enforcement of
these rules; the European authorities would not intervene as such in either aspect of
control.
3.6. Is control necessary on the European level?
From the previous discussion it should be apparent that it is neither inherently
necessary nor desirable to organize a supranational, federal control body compa-
rable to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. First, several Member States
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have repeatedly refused to consider the creation of such a control authority and,
second, it is doubtful whether the European Community authorities have any
powers under present Rome Treaty provisions to establish new organizations
entrusted with rule or policy-making powers or even with any competence exceed-
ing administrative execution of their statutory mission. Third, the creation of a top-
heavy and bureaucratic control body is not necessarily the only approach: it is pos-
sible to develop an alternative pattern of common rule-making that will provide for
a sufficient degree of parallelism and equality of substantive regulation in each
Member State and yet will not change the basic characteristics of present regulatory
frameworks too much. Thus, different types of regulation which exist in the Com-
munity - public or governmental regulation, private or corporate regulation, and all
other intermediate forms - would be put on the same footing.
The organizational framework adopted for integrating the European securities
markets would be based on a division of powers: general policy-making would be
formulated on the European level by the Member States acting in common, while
implementation and surveillance of the schemes would be entrusted to national
control authorities. On the Community level, a permanent organization would have
to be created, composed of the Commission and representatives from each Member
State. This organization would be charged with the creation of the Integrated Secu-
rities Market, its permanent role being the formulation of a common European pol-
icy on all matters relating to securities. In some ways, this proposed organization is
comparable to the Contact Committees recently created pursuant to EC Directives.
The execution or implementation of this centrally formulated policy would be
entrusted to national authorities. Each Member State would have to decide how it
would translate the common policy into its own d6mestic regulatory system. Day-
to-day administration and surveillance would be delegated to the appropriate
domestic authorities, public or corporative (private). Implementation of the com-
mon central policy would be accomplished according to each Member State's
respective legal system or traditions, whether by government law-making or by cor-
porative self-regulatory rules or by other means, e.g. private contract forms. Just as
is presently the case with EC Directives, compliance with this common central
policy would need to be ensured. The European Community, acting through the
Commission [50], or preferably through the proposed European-level policy-
making body, would have to ensure that the rules are observed, and that implemen-
tation would result in equivalent conditions in each Member State.
This integration and rule-making scheme would not differ fundamentally from
the approach presently followed by the Community in harmonizing national regu-
lation through the use of Community Directives. However, the technique used to
transmit the common central policy to the national authorities entrusted with its
implementation must be made more effective and more flexible than is presently
the case with Directives: market integration will never be achieved if the present
five to eight year "gestation" period for Community Directives is not shortened.
The proposed rule-making framework would function best if it emerged as a
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procedure similar to the 1978 procedure worked out in the United Kingdom. In
that country, the Council for the Securities Industry (CSI) acts essentially as a
"policy-making body" for matters in which the entire City is involved [51]. Just as
has been proposed for the EC organization, the CSI is never directly concerned with
questions of control or surveillance: these remain in the hands of the corporate or
professional organizations which support the CSI's activity.
Day-to-day functioning and surveillance of the Integrated System's telecommu-
nications network would need to be monitored by a Central Market Management
Committee (CMMC). It would be entrusted with all authority necessary to imple-
ment the common instructions dealing with the telecommunications system itself.
The CMMC would be a technical, executive body that would ensure the smooth
and correct operation of the System's electronic and telecommunications infra-
structure. It would also be given certain surveillance powers with respect to trans-
actions executed in the integrated network: insider trading or other forms of
market manipulation would be a primary spotting task of the CMMC. If illegal con-
duct were suspected, further investigation would be handled by the national control
bodies supervising the brokers during the particular surveillance period. These same
authorities would also impose sanctions on these brokers. As all Member States and
all participants in the markets would have a common interest in seeing that the mar-
ket is free of illegal conduct, it might prove useful to go a step further and associate
a representative of CMMC with the investigative and procedural activities under-
taken by the national control bodies. This representative could act as a liaison
between the different national control bodies involved. Article 89 of the Treaty of
Rome contains a comparable division of duties in the area of investigations of viola-
tions of the Treaty's antitrust provisions [52].
3.7. The role of the national control bodies and the national stock exchanges
The formation of an integrated securities market is of direct relevance only to a
limited number-of securities. Stock exchanges would remain important for all other
securities not touched by the Integrated System. It would be necessary in this
regard to exclude local trading in System securities: otherwise, price differences
incompatible with the concept of an integrated market would reappear.
The various existing stock exchanges and control bodies would retain their pre-
sent powers and competencies in securities matters, but as far as the Integrated
Markettis concerned they would not be allowed to exercise these powers except in
accordance with the centrally formulated securities policy. Whether a similar
approach should be followed with regard to securities other than those admitted to
the Integrated Market would depend on the choice made by the European authori-
ties in accordance with their present harmonization efforts in the area.
The competence of the national control authorities in the field of securities regu-
lation would include the admission of securities to the stock exchanges and all
related issues, such as disclosure policies and rules of conduct for companies with
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securities listed on exchanges (e.g. takeovers, ethical rules for company directors,
etc.). The admission of persons to the securities trading profession would likewise
belong to national control organizations. So long as they participated in the Inte-
grated System, however, all powers exercised by these control authorities would
have to be in accordance with the common central policy formulated on the Com-
munity level. Thus, action on matters concerning minimum capital, guarantee rules,
or surveillance systems to monitor brokers' activities would have to comply with
the central policy. However, actual implementation of these rules would be left
entirely to the national bodies: surveillance, investigation, and the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions would be left to them. Admission of securities brokers to the
Integrated Market would be automatic for all those who met the pre-fixed admis-
sion requirements (e.g. minimum guarantee, connection with all Integrated Market
System facilities, etc.).
Rules governing the negotiation of securities within the System should be cen-
trally fixed as well: otherwise, distortions in price formation would appear, caused
by differences in the applicable rules. Matters concerning the legal definition of
orders acceptable in the Integrated Market, the currencies to be used in price and
quotation announcements, the status of limit orders, the revocability of orders, and
so on, should be agreed upon centrally. Whether this same common rule-making
policy would also extend beyond trading rules to cover questions such as the neces-
sity of broker intervention in securities transactions, or the obligation of market
participants to bring all orders to the stock exchange floor, or further, to techniques
for executing orders (e.g. the prohibition of transactions by principals when orders
are executed by agents, or the Selbsteintritt in Germany [53], leverage techniques,
margin requirements, etc.), or for settling executed transactions, are matters to
be discussed separately. But probably, several of the subjects could be left to the
Member States' free decision [541. Similarly, commission rates should be decided
upon by the individual States: this would ensure competition among brokers within
the Integrated Market System.
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[1] Denmark, Italy and, with respect to Eurobonds, Luxembourg as well.
[2] Source: Kredietbank-Belgium, Bulletin No. 44 (1979).
[3] In the Netherlands the three securities brokers associations were merged into one, called
"Vereniging voor de effectenhandel". The local markets in The Hague and in Rotterdam were
closed down in 1972.
[4] Founded in 1961, the FIBV is a consultative association whose members include the
stock exchanges of fourteen different countries.
[5] Organisation de cooperation et de ddveloppement 6conomiques - Comit6 des marches
financiers, Normes minimales de divulgation de I'OCDE, applicables a toute offre publique de
titres (Paris, 1976). The efficient functioning of the secondary securities markets is expressly
mentioned in the preamble to this recommendation.
[6] See the recommendation adopted by the OCDE on February 26, 1976.
[7] See FIBV Brochure (Paris, September 1978) which contains the full text of all resolu-
tions and recommendations adopted by the FIBV.
[8] See O.J. Eur. Comm., No. 912/60, July 12, 1960; O.J. Eur. Comm., No. 62163, January
22, 1963. The Third Directive concerning capital movement was prepared, but never formally
adopted, by the Commission. In 1978 the Commission proposed the liberalization of transac-
tions in connection with investment funds. See Monetary Committee Report for 1978, 0.3.
Eur. Comm. 1979, No. C 240/16.
[9] Directive of March 5, 1979, coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities
to official stock exchange listing, OJ. Eur. Comm., No. L 66/21. February 16, 1979. For an
extensive comment see Wymeersch, La Directive sur les conditions d'adnission en bourse,
Revue de la banque, (1980), Cahier No. 6.
[10] Prospectus Directive O.J. Eur. Comm., No. L 100/1; see also O.J. 1980, C 335/19.
[11] Proposal for a Directive concerning information to be published on a regular basis by
companies whose transferable securities are admitted to official stock exchange listing, O.J.
Eur. Comm. 1979, No. C 29/5; amended proposal O.J. 1980, No. C 210/5.
[12] Proposal for a Directive concerning coordination of laws, regulations and administra-
tive provisions regarding collective investment undertakings for transferable securities, O.. Eur.
Comm. 1976, No. C 171/1.
[13] 0.. Eur. Comm. 1968, No. L 65/8; OJ. Eur. Comm. 1977, No. L 26/1; O.J. Eur.
Comm. 1978, No. L 295/36; OJ. Eur. Comm. 1978, No. L 222/1.
[14] Proposals have been published for three other company law Directives: OJ. Eur.
Comm. 1972, No. C 131/49; O.J. Eur. Comm. 1976, No. C 121/2 and 1979, No. C 14/2; OJ.
Eur. Comm. 1978, No. C 112/6 and 1979, No. C 317/6.
[151 Although only the Admission and Prospectus Directives have been formally adopted,
it can be stated that the overall integration scheme is, by and large, the same as the one upon
which the Admission Directive is based.
E16] The scope of the powers of the EEC under the present Treaty is still the subject of
debate. For an extensive interpretation see E.G.F. Marx, Funktion und Grengen der Rechts-
angleichung nach art. 100 EWG-Vertrag (1976) at 48 et seq.
[17] Member States may not introduce subsequent legislation that would result in departure
from the rules in a fashion contrary to the Directives. See the Simmenthal case, 1978, E.C.R.
629.
[18] The result in the United States was, however, achieved only after fierce battles were
waged. Concerning the listing of New York Stock Exchange securities on regional stock
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exchanges see Matter of the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 SEC 270 (1941). Con-
cerning the trading of OTC securities on stock exchanges, see the dispute relating to "unlisted
trading privileges," finally settled in 1964 (cf. L. Loss, Securities Regulation at 1132 et seq.),
and more recently, the inclusion of listed securities in the NASDAQ over-the-counter trading
system (cf Securities Industry Study, Report of the Subcommittee on Securities, Committee of
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 192 and 200).
[19] Only one foreign security is admitted to the Italian stock exchanges.
[20] E.g., Admission Directive, art. 9;see also Admission Directive preamble.
[21] For a more detailed discussion see Wymeersch,supra note 9.
[221 Admission Directive, art. 5(1).
[23] The Directive's preamble indicates that the Directive does not intend to give issuers
any right to listing. As regards the right to apply to the courts, it states that "such right...
must not be allowed to restrict the discretion of these authorities".
[24] Cf Admission Directive, art. 9(3).
[25] Judicial scrutiny will be exercised to determine whether a "special condition" was
based upon motives of investor protection.
[26] Admission Directive Schedule C, No. 6(a); Admission Directive Schedule D, No. A(5)
and No. B(2).
[27] Admission Directive Schedule C. No. 6(b). This restriction may have been introduced
in order to avoid the very extensive disclosures required by the SEC with respect to issues that
have - at least in the opinion of the drafters of the Directive - no direct bearing on the fiman-
cial value of the investment.
[28] The Directive contains no obligation to organize administrative control over these
publications. It would be sufficient if some technique of enforcement were provided for, e.g.
imposition of criminal or other sanctions.
[29] Among the many recent writings on this subject, see M. Marescau, De Directe Werking
van het Europese Gemeenschapsrecht (1978) (to be published in English); A. Dashwood, The
Principle of Direct Effect in European Community Law, 1979 J. Common Market Studies 229,
244; A. Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations on Individuals? 1979 European L. Rev. 67;
C. Timmermans, Directives and their Effect within the National Legal Systems, 16 Common
Market L. Rev. 533 (1979).
[30] Enables members of the national control bodies to exchange confidential information
without violating their traditional secrecy duties, but extends the legal protection of secrecy to
all Member States.
[311 See declarations of Mr. Imbert, Director of the European Commission, in Committee
to Review the Functioning of the Financial Institutions, Second Stage Evidence, vol. 1, at 79.
[321 It is not contended here that the harmonization directives are designed to bring about
integration of the markets.
[33] For a recent survey see R. Lauwaars, Auxiliary Organs and Agencies in the EEC, 16
Common Market L. Rev. 369 (1979). Concerning doubts and questions raised with respect to
the EMS, see M. Seidel, Das Europaische Wgihrungssystem - Rechtliche Grundlage und Aus-
gestaltung, EuR (1979) at 13, which analyzes the question, which is also relevant with respect
to the integration of securities markets, whether Article 235 of the Treaty contains a sufficient
basis for the EMS.
[341 Articles 155 and 169 of theTreaty.
[35] See E. Wymeersch, The Control of the Securities Markets in the EEC in Commission of
the European Communities, Series Competition (1978) No. 31 and No. 56 et seq.
[361 See supra note 29.
[37] Clearly other integration patterns besides the plan to be discussed could be designed.
Thus, for example, rather than continuing with the present policy of multiple listings, Member
States might prefer to adopt a scheme in which all orders would be channelled and concen-
trated on one of the Member State's stock exchanges, e.g. that stock exchange where the issuer
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is located or where the bulk of the transactions occur. There is no doubt that such an approach
would be most unwelcome in the Member States, since, for some at least, this would mean an
almost total disappearance of their securities markets. Furthermore, this would constitute a
return to a nationalistic approach incompatible with the philosophy of the EEC.
[38] E.g., see Y. Flornoy, Projets d'harnonisation et d'dlargissement des marchds offlciels
en bourse dans la communiti europdenne in L'avenir des marches de valeurs mobilires (Jour-
n~es d'Etudes 1976, Institut Universitatire International Luxembourg). See also AIBD, The
Future Structure of the Securities Markets, Paris Conference, May 26, 1977; Dr. Mario Diana,
Europe and the Stock Exchange: A Road Towards an Euro-Exchange, Lecture given at Fish-
monger Hall on January 16,1980.
[39] C. Tugendhat, Orientations de la Commission europdenne sur le r6le des bourses de
valeur dans la CEE, in Europe, Document no. 1083, January 29, 1980.
[40] IM. Hessels, Vooruitzichten en problemen voor een geintegreerde Europese effecten-
markt, Bank- en effectenbedrijf (1972) at 462.
[41] See alsoE. Wymeersch, supra note 35.
[42] E.g., admission disclosure, annual and interim disclosures, etc.
[43] This proposal is directly related to the question of the transmission of quotations
which will be dealt with later.
[44] For example, some Member States (France, Italy and to a lesser extent Belgium) pro-
hibit any principal or dealer activity in securities, while others (Luxembourg and Germany)
allow orders coming from different directions to be set off within the same banking institution
to be completed with orders held by other banks. Regardless of the technique used to execute
the order, it would be reported to the Integrated Market System, with the caveat that order
execution by way of setoff could not occur at more favorable prices than those prevailing on
the market.
[45] Whether this would remain the sole method of trading securities in London will have
to be analyzed separately since London brokers may prefer to be put on the same footing as
brokers in other Member States who would be entitled to enter limit orders directly into the
system themselves.
[46] E.g. in cases in which the quotation has already been hit by other market participants
or the parties are still discussing a transaction initiated within the system.
[47] However, under present rules banks or "remisier" receiving orders from the public are
not prevented from transmitting these orders abroad.
[48] Italy, Denmark, and to the extent that it relates to Eurobonds, this is also true for
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.
[49] For further discussion see also subsection 3.5 infra.
[50] Compare the procedures applicable pursuant to Articles 155 and 169 of the Treaty.
See also, supra note 34.
[51] For a description of the CSI see Bank of England Bulletin (1979) no. 2.
[52] Another instrument of integration worthy of consideration is the organization of an
appeal procedure before the Committee against certain decisions of the national control bodies
concerning such matters as delistings and disciplinary proceedings.
[53] Handelsgesetzbuch §-400; see also Wymeersch, The Control of the Securities Markets
in the Member States of the European Community, Part 1, no. 80 (to be published in English
in 1980 by The European Commission in the Series "Competition").
[54] This implies that vis-a-vis the Integrated Market System these features did not become
apparent and therefore that they would not affect the functioning of the market.
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